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On Māyāvāda, by Hermann Jacobi, Professor in the University of Bonn, Germany.

In my last article[1] I have discussed the attitude taken up by the orthodox philosophers in India towards the epistemology of the Buddhists. In connection with this discussion I shall now treat the question about the nature of early Vedānta, and, as I hope, bring it nearer to a conclusion.

The arguments of the Buddhists of both the Nihilistic and Idealistic schools regarding the unreality of the objects of perception may thus be summarised. Our perceptions in dreams do not, in principle, differ from those in the waking state, and consequently the latter must be just as void and as independent of something existing beside them (their object) as the dream-impressions; further examples of impressions void of really existing objects are magic, fata morgana, and mirage. This view of the Illusionists is confuted much in the same way in the Nyāya and Brahma Sūtras; here we are concerned with the latter only. The discussion of Bādarāyaṇa (B. S. II, 2, 28—32) as illustrated by the passage from the ancient Vṛttikāra, quoted by Śabarasvāmin in the Bhāṣya on M. S. 1, 1, 5 (see above, 31. 23), leaves no doubt on the point at issue, viz. that, according to these ancient Vedānta authors, there is a generic difference between dream-impressions and waking impressions, and that therefore the latter are not independent of really existing objects.

The oldest work on Vedānta Philosophy besides Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma Sūtras, are the Karikā's[2] on the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad

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[1] The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmans; see JAOS. 31. 1 ff.

[2] Anandasrama Series, No. 10. An English translation of the text and Commentary has been issued in India; but the book has not been accessible to me.

by Gauḍapāda.[1] The chronological relation between Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍapāda will be discussed hereafter; for the present we have to deal with his philosophical opinions. Gauḍapāda is, as far as we know, the first author who formulated the Māyāvāda or the doctrine that everything except Brahma is an illusion; this doctrine was either originated by him, or by a school of thinkers of whom he became the head; the latter alternative would seem the more probable one.

Now Gauḍapāda has used the very same arguments as the Buddhists to prove the unreality (*vaitathyam* = *asatyatvam*) of the external objects of our perceptions; he states this argument in II 4 which is thus explained by his commentator, Śaṅkara[2]: "Things seen in the waking state are not true: this is the proposition (*pratijñā*); because they are seen: this is the reason (*hetu*); just like things seen in a dream: this is the instance (*dṛṣṭānta*); as things seen in dream are not true, so the property of being seen belongs in like manner (to things seen) in the waking state: this is the application of the reason (*hetūpanaya*); therefore things seen in the waking state are also untrue: this is the conclusion (*nigamana*). Things seen in a dream differ from those seen in waking in that the former are reduced in size because they are within (the body of the dreamer). But there is no difference in so far as both are 'seen' and are 'untrue'." — And in II 31 all unreal things are mentioned together: "As dreams or magic or fata morgana are regarded (as unreal by ordinary men), so this whole world is regarded by those versed in the Vedāntas".

The argument thus expounded by Gauḍapāda forms the basis of his doctrine of Māyāvāda, and it is, as we know, the same argument which the Buddhists employed to establish the

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[1] I fully concur with Mr. Barnet in his review of Max Walleser, Zur Geschichte und Kritik des älteren Vedānta (Heidelberg 1910) in JRAS 1910 that Gauḍapāda is the name of the author and that it has not wrongly been abstracted from the title Gauḍapādīya Kārikāḥ. Whether the author be the same as, or different from the Gauḍapāda the oldest commentator on the Sāṅkhya Kārikās, in both cases there can be no doubt that Gauḍapāda was an actual name.

[2] I am inclined to think that this Śaṅkara is not the same as the author of the Śārīraka Bhāṣya. The latter would hardly have stated the argument in the form and the terms of an *anumāna* according to Nyāya principles.

Śūnyavāda. As that argument is strenuously confuted by Bādarāyaṇa, it is evident that he cannot have held the same opinion in this matter as Gauḍapāda, or, in other words, the Brahma Sūtras do not teach the Māyāvāda. This is one point which I wish to make.

The next question we must try to solve is whether Gauḍapāda is acquainted with the Śūnyavāda or the Vijñānavāda. The answer is furnished by kārikās IV 24 ff. For in kārikā 24 a Realist contends that ideas (*prajñapti*) and feelings would not arise if not caused by external things. The opponent, in kārikās 25—27, shows the unreasonableness of assuming objects existing beside and independent of ideas (*prajñapti*, *citta*). This refutation is, as the commentator tells us, "the argument of the Buddhists of the Vijñānavādin school, who combat the opinion of the realists (*bāhyārthavādin*), and the Ācārya agrees with him thus far". That the statement of the commentator is right, is evident from the nature of the argument itself, and becomes still more so from the next verse (28), which furnishes the final decision of the Vedāntin: "Therefore the idea (*citta*) does not originate, nor does the object of the idea originate; those who pretend to recognise the originating of ideas, may as well recognise the trace (of birds) in the air". For here the fundamental doctrine of the Vijñānavādins, which admits only a continuous flow of momentary ideas, is clearly referred to and confuted. Since the Brahma Sūtras and the ancient Vṛtti refer to the Śūnyavāda only, as I hope to have established in my former article, the Gauḍapādīya Kārikās which allude to the latest phase of Buddhist philosophy must be considerably younger than the Brahma Sūtras. This has always been the opinion of the Pandits. It has, however, lately been controverted by Dr. Walleser[1] on the ground that the Gauḍapādīya Kārikās only are quoted in ancient Buddhist books as an authority on Vedānta philosophy. Even in case this assertion should be confirmed by the progress of research, the alleged fact would not necessarily upset the above result. For the enigmatical character of the sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa make them unfit for quotations, at least of an outsider, to illustrate a point of Vedānta philosophy. And besides the

[1] l. c. p. 23.

Buddhists may have ignored the old Vedānta of Bādarāyaṇa as the Jainas did so late as the ninth century A. D.[1]; but they could not well have ignored the Gauḍapādī, since that work taught a philosophy which resembled their own in many regards.

Our inquiry has established 1. the near relation, amounting almost to identity, between the epistemology of the Śūnyavādins or Vijñānavādins on one side and of Gauḍapāda's Māyāvāda on the other; 2. the opposition of the latter to Bādarāyaṇa on this head; and 3. the posteriority of Gauḍapāda to Bādarāyaṇa. Now these facts admit, in my opinion, of a natural and probable construction, viz. that Gauḍapāda adapted the Illusionism of the Buddhists to the teachings of the Upaniṣads. This view is supported by the many coincidences between the Gauḍapadīya Kārikās and the Mādhyamika sūtras to which Professor L. de la Vallée Poussin has lately drawn attention.[2] The theory, that the Māyāvāda is a Vedāntic adaptation of the Sūnyavāda, has been first put forward by V. A. Sukhtankar[3]; I may add that I perfectly agree with him.

The probable history of the Māyāvāda may be briefly described: originally the doctrine of some school of Aupaniṣadas, it became an orthodox philosophy, when it had successfully been made the basis of interpretation of the Brahma sūtras, already by earlier writers and finally by the great Śaṅkara. For the two Mīmāṃsās are the preeminently orthodox systems; but we should never lose sight of the fact that they are originally and primarily systems of the Exegesis of the Revelation, the Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā of the Revelation as far as it is concerned with sacrifice (*karmakāṇḍa*), and the Uttarā Mīmāṃsā with regard to Brahma. These two schools of orthodox theologians developed philosophical doctrines of their own, but these are found in the Bhāṣyas and are scarcely alluded to in the sūtras themselves.

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[1] Haribhadra, Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya v. 3; Siddharṣi, Upamitibhavaprapañcā Kathā p. 661 ff.; see above vol. 31, p. 6 note 3.

[2] JRAS 1910 p. 128 ff.

[3] WZKM vol. 22, p. 136 ff. see also above vol. 31, p. 8, note 1.